wildcard-probe signature + 31st OUI (DeFlockJoplin)

Adds Michael / DeFlockJoplin's high-precision detection method on top of
the NitekryDPaul baseline: a Flock camera is flagged when it transmits a
Probe Request (type=0 subtype=4) with a wildcard SSID IE (tag 0 len 0)
AND its addr2 matches the OUI list. Drive-test in Joplin: 11/12 cameras
caught with only 2 false positives.

- New AlertType ALERT_WILDCARD_PROBE, emitted as detection_method
  'wifi_wildcard_probe' (high-precision class)
- Wildcard-probe hits suppress the addr2 broad alert for the same frame
  to prevent double counting; non-probe OUI matches still emit as
  'wifi_oui_addr2'
- IE parser returns tri-state (1=wildcard / 0=directed / -1=no SSID IE),
  with FCS-trailer retry only on the -1 no-IE case
- addr1 receiver-side sleeper-catch and the optional addr3 + SSID paths
  are unchanged — wildcard is purely additive
- 31st OUI 82:6b:f2 added to target_ouis[] and to the dataset doc; it's
  the OUI of the 12th camera in Michael's drive-test that the original
  30 didn't catch
- README explains the wildcard-probe method, credits Michael with a link
  to github.com/DeflockJoplin/flock-you, and bumps Acknowledgments

Source: https://github.com/DeflockJoplin/flock-you
This commit is contained in:
Colonel Panic
2026-04-24 06:40:03 -04:00
parent f537c7d194
commit 467901d2f7
3 changed files with 124 additions and 16 deletions
+69 -11
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,11 @@ static const char* target_ouis[] = {
"94:08:53", "e4:aa:ea", "f4:6a:dd", "f8:a2:d6", "24:b2:b9",
"00:f4:8d", "d0:39:57", "e8:d0:fc", "e0:4f:43", "b8:1e:a4",
"70:08:94", "58:8e:81", "ec:1b:bd", "3c:71:bf", "58:00:e3",
"90:35:ea", "5c:93:a2", "64:6e:69", "48:27:ea", "a4:cf:12"
"90:35:ea", "5c:93:a2", "64:6e:69", "48:27:ea", "a4:cf:12",
// Contributed by Michael / DeFlockJoplin — discovered via wildcard-probe
// + OUI signature during field testing. The 12th camera in his drive-test
// used this prefix and wasn't in @NitekryDPaul's original 30.
"82:6b:f2"
};
static const size_t OUI_COUNT = sizeof(target_ouis) / sizeof(target_ouis[0]);
@@ -103,10 +107,14 @@ static uint8_t oui_bytes[OUI_COUNT][3];
#define ALERT_QUEUE_SIZE 32
typedef enum : uint8_t {
ALERT_OUI_ADDR2 = 0,
ALERT_OUI_ADDR1 = 1,
ALERT_OUI_ADDR3 = 2,
ALERT_SSID = 3,
ALERT_OUI_ADDR2 = 0,
ALERT_OUI_ADDR1 = 1,
ALERT_OUI_ADDR3 = 2,
ALERT_SSID = 3,
// Probe Request + wildcard SSID (tag 0, length 0) from a known-OUI addr2.
// Tight signature from Michael / DeFlockJoplin field research:
// https://github.com/DeflockJoplin/flock-you
ALERT_WILDCARD_PROBE = 4,
} AlertType;
typedef struct {
@@ -446,11 +454,12 @@ static void printHeartbeat() {
static const char* alertTypeToMethod(AlertType t) {
switch (t) {
case ALERT_OUI_ADDR2: return "oui_addr2";
case ALERT_OUI_ADDR1: return "oui_addr1";
case ALERT_OUI_ADDR3: return "oui_addr3";
case ALERT_SSID: return "ssid";
default: return "unknown";
case ALERT_OUI_ADDR2: return "oui_addr2";
case ALERT_OUI_ADDR1: return "oui_addr1";
case ALERT_OUI_ADDR3: return "oui_addr3";
case ALERT_SSID: return "ssid";
case ALERT_WILDCARD_PROBE: return "wildcard_probe";
default: return "unknown";
}
}
@@ -797,6 +806,24 @@ static bool IRAM_ATTR extractSsidFromMgmtBody(const uint8_t* body, int len,
return false;
}
// Returns:
// 1 = wildcard SSID IE found (tag 0, length 0) → Flock-style probe
// 0 = SSID IE found, non-zero length → directed probe, not ours
// -1 = no SSID IE found at all → caller should retry with
// FCS-stripped length, then bail
static int IRAM_ATTR isWildcardProbeIE(const uint8_t* body, int len) {
if (!body || len < 2) return -1;
while (len >= 2) {
uint8_t id = body[0];
uint8_t elen = body[1];
if ((int)elen + 2 > len) break;
if (id == 0) return (elen == 0) ? 1 : 0;
body += elen + 2;
len -= elen + 2;
}
return -1;
}
static void IRAM_ATTR wifiSniffer(void* buf, wifi_promiscuous_pkt_type_t type) {
if (!buf || sniffingStopped) return;
@@ -820,8 +847,39 @@ static void IRAM_ATTR wifiSniffer(void* buf, wifi_promiscuous_pkt_type_t type) {
uint8_t ch = (uint8_t)pkt->rx_ctrl.channel; // actual rx channel from driver
// --- OUI check: addr2 (transmitter/source) ---
//
// For mgmt Probe Requests (type=0 subtype=4) from a matched OUI, tighten
// to the DeFlockJoplin wildcard-probe signature: SSID IE (tag 0) length
// must be zero. This reduces false positives dramatically (Michael's field
// test: 11/12 true-positive with only 2 false-positives in Joplin).
//
// Non-probe frames from the same OUI still emit the broad ADDR2 alert.
// See: https://github.com/DeflockJoplin/flock-you
if (matchOuiRaw(hdr->addr2)) {
enqueueAlert(ALERT_OUI_ADDR2, hdr->addr2, rssi, ch, nullptr, "addr2");
bool emitted = false;
if (type == WIFI_PKT_MGMT) {
uint8_t fc0 = hdr->frame_ctrl & 0xFF;
uint8_t ftype = (fc0 >> 2) & 0x03;
uint8_t subtype = (fc0 >> 4) & 0x0F;
if (ftype == 0 && subtype == 4) { // Probe Request
int sigLen = (int)pkt->rx_ctrl.sig_len;
int bodyLen = sigLen - (int)sizeof(wifi_ieee80211_mac_hdr_t);
const uint8_t* body = pkt->payload + sizeof(wifi_ieee80211_mac_hdr_t);
int r = (bodyLen > 0) ? isWildcardProbeIE(body, bodyLen) : -1;
// FCS-trailer retry: only when the first parse found no SSID IE AT
// ALL (-1). A found-but-nonzero (0) means legit directed probe; do
// not retry — it would mis-classify.
if (r == -1 && bodyLen > 4) r = isWildcardProbeIE(body, bodyLen - 4);
if (r == 1) {
enqueueAlert(ALERT_WILDCARD_PROBE, hdr->addr2, rssi, ch,
nullptr, "probe_req");
emitted = true;
}
}
}
if (!emitted) {
enqueueAlert(ALERT_OUI_ADDR2, hdr->addr2, rssi, ch, nullptr, "addr2");
}
}
#if CHECK_ADDR1