Files
rayhunter/lib/src/analysis/diagnostic.rs
2026-02-05 15:41:54 -08:00

162 lines
7.3 KiB
Rust

use crate::analysis::analyzer::{Analyzer, Event, EventType};
use crate::analysis::information_element::{InformationElement, LteInformationElement};
use pycrate_rs::nas::NASMessage;
use pycrate_rs::nas::emm::EMMMessage;
use pycrate_rs::nas::generated::emm::emm_attach_reject::EMMCauseEMMCause as AttachRejectEMMCause;
//use pycrate_rs::nas::generated::emm::emm_attach_request::EPSAttachTypeV;
use pycrate_rs::nas::generated::emm::emm_detach_request_mt::EPSDetachTypeMTType;
use pycrate_rs::nas::generated::emm::emm_service_reject::EMMCauseEMMCause as ServiceRejectEMMCause;
use pycrate_rs::nas::generated::emm::emm_tracking_area_update_reject::EMMCauseEMMCause as TAURejectEMMCause;
use std::borrow::Cow;
pub struct DiagnosticAnalyzer;
impl DiagnosticAnalyzer {
pub fn new() -> Self {
DiagnosticAnalyzer
}
fn is_imsi_exposing_nas(&self, nas_msg: &NASMessage) -> bool {
match nas_msg {
NASMessage::EMMMessage(emm_msg) => match emm_msg {
EMMMessage::EMMIdentityRequest(_) => true, // Alert on all identity requests (IMSI, IMEI, IMEISV)
EMMMessage::EMMTrackingAreaUpdateReject(reject) => {
matches!(
reject.emm_cause.inner,
TAURejectEMMCause::IllegalUE
| TAURejectEMMCause::IllegalME
| TAURejectEMMCause::EPSServicesNotAllowed
| TAURejectEMMCause::EPSServicesAndNonEPSServicesNotAllowed
| TAURejectEMMCause::TrackingAreaNotAllowed
| TAURejectEMMCause::EPSServicesNotAllowedInThisPLMN
| TAURejectEMMCause::RequestedServiceOptionNotAuthorizedInThisPLMN
)
}
EMMMessage::EMMAttachReject(reject) => {
matches!(
reject.emm_cause.inner,
AttachRejectEMMCause::IllegalUE
| AttachRejectEMMCause::IllegalME
| AttachRejectEMMCause::EPSServicesNotAllowed
| AttachRejectEMMCause::EPSServicesAndNonEPSServicesNotAllowed
| AttachRejectEMMCause::PLMNNotAllowed
| AttachRejectEMMCause::TrackingAreaNotAllowed
| AttachRejectEMMCause::RoamingNotAllowedInThisTrackingArea
| AttachRejectEMMCause::EPSServicesNotAllowedInThisPLMN
| AttachRejectEMMCause::NoSuitableCellsInTrackingArea
| AttachRejectEMMCause::RequestedServiceOptionNotAuthorizedInThisPLMN
)
}
EMMMessage::EMMDetachRequestMT(req) => {
// Original implementation: !(nas_eps.emm.detach_type_dl == 3)
req.eps_detach_type.inner.typ != EPSDetachTypeMTType::IMSIDetach
}
EMMMessage::EMMAttachRequest(_) => {
// just because eps_attach_type is IMSI doesn't mean that the phoen transmitted its IMSI
// It often sends the GUTI instead. We could check the req.epsid structure but it appears to actually
// not be parsed. So for now we are just ignoreing this message
// req.eps_attach_type.inner == EPSAttachTypeV::CombinedEPSIMSIAttach
false
}
EMMMessage::EMMServiceReject(reject) => {
matches!(
reject.emm_cause.inner,
ServiceRejectEMMCause::IllegalUE
| ServiceRejectEMMCause::IllegalME
| ServiceRejectEMMCause::EPSServicesNotAllowed
| ServiceRejectEMMCause::UEIdentityCannotBeDerivedByTheNetwork
| ServiceRejectEMMCause::TrackingAreaNotAllowed
| ServiceRejectEMMCause::EPSServicesNotAllowedInThisPLMN
| ServiceRejectEMMCause::RequestedServiceOptionNotAuthorizedInThisPLMN
)
}
_ => false,
},
_ => false,
}
}
}
impl Analyzer for DiagnosticAnalyzer {
fn get_name(&self) -> Cow<'_, str> {
"Diagnostic detector for messages which might lead to IMSI exposure".into()
}
fn get_description(&self) -> Cow<'_, str> {
"Catches any messages that may lead to IMSI Exposure. Can be quite noisy. \
Useful as a diagnostic for finding out why an IMSI was sent or what \
the reason for a reject message was. Not a useful indicator on its own \
but a helpful diagnostic for understanding why another indicator was \
triggered. Based on the list of IMSI exposing messages identified in \
the 'Marlin' paper."
.into()
}
fn get_version(&self) -> u32 {
1
}
fn analyze_information_element(
&mut self,
ie: &InformationElement,
_packet_num: usize,
) -> Option<Event> {
let lte_ie = match ie {
InformationElement::LTE(inner) => inner,
_ => return None,
};
match lte_ie.as_ref() {
LteInformationElement::NAS(nas_msg) => {
if self.is_imsi_exposing_nas(nas_msg) {
let message_type = match nas_msg {
NASMessage::EMMMessage(emm_msg) => match emm_msg {
EMMMessage::EMMIdentityRequest(request) => {
format!("EMM Identity Request ({:?})", request.id_type.inner)
}
EMMMessage::EMMTrackingAreaUpdateReject(reject) => {
format!(
"EMM Tracking Area Update Reject ({:?})",
reject.emm_cause.inner
)
}
EMMMessage::EMMAttachReject(reject) => {
format!("EMM Attach Reject ({:?})", reject.emm_cause.inner)
}
EMMMessage::EMMDetachRequestMT(request) => {
format!(
"EMM Detach Request ({:?}:{:?})",
request.eps_detach_type.inner, request.emm_cause.inner
)
}
EMMMessage::EMMServiceReject(reject) => {
format!("EMM Service Reject ({:?})", reject.emm_cause.inner)
}
EMMMessage::EMMAttachRequest(request) => {
format!("EPS Attach Request ({:?})", request.epsid.inner)
}
_ => "Unknown EMM Message".to_string(),
},
_ => "Unknown NAS Message".to_string(),
};
Some(Event {
event_type: EventType::Informational,
message: format!("Diagnostic: {message_type}."),
})
} else {
None
}
}
_ => None,
}
}
}