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Docs: add installation and run instructions to README
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@@ -9,16 +9,40 @@ Paste a Bitcoin wallet descriptor into the input screen and click **Analyze**. S
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## Vulnerabilities detected
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## Vulnerabilities detected
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### Address Reuse
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### Address Reuse
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Detects when the same address has received more than one payment. Address reuse is one of the most damaging privacy practices in Bitcoin: it links multiple transactions to a single entity and permanently exposes the full balance history of that address to anyone inspecting the chain.
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Detects when the same address has received more than one payment. Address reuse links multiple transactions to a single entity and permanently exposes the full balance history of that address to anyone inspecting the chain.
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### Dust Spend
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Identifies UTXOs that originated from dust attacks — tiny amounts sent by a third party specifically to track a wallet. When the user later spends that dust alongside their own coins, the inputs are merged, linking previously unconnected addresses and revealing ownership clusters.
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### UTXO Consolidation
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Flags transactions where multiple UTXOs were combined into a single output. Consolidation is a strong on-chain signal that all the input addresses belong to the same wallet (the Common Input Ownership Heuristic). The resulting UTXO carries the taint of every address that funded it.
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### CIOH (Common Input Ownership Heuristic)
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### CIOH (Common Input Ownership Heuristic)
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Detects UTXOs that were created by, or whose history involves, transactions where inputs from different addresses were co-signed. This is the foundational clustering heuristic used by chain-analysis firms to link addresses to a single entity.
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Detects transactions where inputs from multiple of your addresses were co-signed. This is the foundational clustering heuristic used by chain-analysis firms: it proves all co-signed inputs belong to the same wallet.
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### Dust Attack
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Identifies UTXOs that originated from dust — tiny amounts sent by a third party to track a wallet. When the user later spends that dust alongside their own coins, the inputs are merged and previously unconnected addresses are linked.
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### Dust Spending
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Flags transactions that spend a dust UTXO together with normal-sized inputs, actively triggering the dust-tracking link.
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### Change Output Detection
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Detects transactions where the change output is trivially identifiable through heuristics such as round-number payments, mismatched script types between change and payment, or use of the internal (BIP-44 `/1/*`) derivation path.
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### UTXO Consolidation
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Flags UTXOs born from a consolidation transaction (many inputs, few outputs). Consolidation merges the histories of all input addresses into one UTXO, amplifying the privacy damage of every prior vulnerability.
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### Script Type Mixing
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Detects transactions that mix different input script types (e.g. P2PKH alongside P2WPKH). This is rare and highly identifying, shrinking the anonymity set significantly.
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### Cluster Merge
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Identifies transactions that merge UTXOs from different funding chains, linking independent coin histories and allowing chain-analysis firms to associate previously separate clusters.
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### UTXO Age Spread
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Flags wallets where unspent outputs have significantly different ages. A wide age spread can reveal hoarding patterns and help correlate activity across time periods.
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### Exchange Origin
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Detects UTXOs received from likely exchange batch withdrawals, identified by high output counts, many unique recipients, and a large input-to-output ratio.
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### Tainted UTXO Merge
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Flags transactions that spend tainted inputs (from known risky sources) alongside clean inputs, spreading taint to the clean coin history.
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### Behavioral Fingerprint
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Analyses patterns across all send transactions — fee rates, output counts, RBF signalling, locktime usage, round amounts, and script type consistency — to detect wallet software fingerprints that chain-analysis firms use for clustering.
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## How to use
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## How to use
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@@ -30,13 +54,84 @@ Detects UTXOs that were created by, or whose history involves, transactions wher
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- A list of all UTXOs currently held by the wallet.
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- A list of all UTXOs currently held by the wallet.
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- For each UTXO, the privacy vulnerabilities detected in its history are highlighted.
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- For each UTXO, the privacy vulnerabilities detected in its history are highlighted.
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## Installation
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### Prerequisites
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| Dependency | Version | Purpose |
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| [Bitcoin Core](https://bitcoincore.org/en/download/) | ≥ 26 | Local regtest node |
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| Python | ≥ 3.10 | Analysis engine (`detect.py`) |
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| Java | 21 | Quarkus backend |
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| Node.js + yarn | ≥ 18 | React frontend |
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### 1. Clone the repository
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```bash
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git clone https://github.com/LORDBABUINO/stealth.git
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cd stealth
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```
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### 2. Bootstrap Bitcoin Core (regtest)
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```bash
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cd backend/script
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./setup.sh # starts bitcoind, creates wallets, mines 110 blocks
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```
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Pass `--fresh` to wipe the chain and start from genesis.
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### 3. Generate vulnerable transactions (required before using the app)
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```bash
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python3 reproduce.py
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```
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This script sends transactions between the test wallets to reproduce all 12 privacy vulnerability types — address reuse, dust attacks, CIOH, consolidation, script-type mixing, and more. **The application will return no findings without this step**, since a freshly mined chain has no transaction history to analyse.
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After it runs, get a descriptor to paste into the app:
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```bash
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bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcwallet=alice listdescriptors | python3 -c \
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"import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin)['descriptors']; print(d[0]['desc'])"
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```
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Copy the output and use it as the descriptor in the application.
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### 4. Start the backend
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```bash
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cd backend/src/StealthBackend
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./mvnw quarkus:dev
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```
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The API will be available at `http://localhost:8080`.
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### 5. Start the frontend
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```bash
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cd frontend
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yarn install
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yarn dev
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```
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Open `http://localhost:5173` in your browser.
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## Running
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1. Paste a wallet descriptor into the input field (e.g. `wpkh([fp/84h/0h/0h]xpub.../0/*)`).
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2. Click **Analyze** — the frontend calls `GET /api/wallet/scan?descriptor=…` on the backend, which runs `detect.py` against your local regtest node.
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3. Review the findings: each entry shows the vulnerability type, severity, and a collapsible details panel.
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## Project structure
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## Project structure
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```
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```
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stealth/
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stealth/
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├── frontend/ # User interface
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├── frontend/ # React + Vite UI
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├── backend/ # Descriptor parsing, chain data fetching, and analysis engine
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├── backend/
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└── slides/ # Slidev pitch presentation
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│ ├── script/ # detect.py, reproduce.py, setup.sh, bitcoin_rpc.py
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│ └── src/ # Quarkus Java REST API
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└── slides/ # Slidev pitch presentation
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```
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```
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## Privacy notice
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## Privacy notice
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